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FM AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9207
INFO RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA IMMEDIATE 8986
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE 1907
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE 8815
RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO IMMEDIATE 3950
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 3371
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE 3675
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 1692
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T KATHMANDU 002548

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TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV MASS MCAP NP

SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR REVIEWS POSSIBLE PARTY-MAOIST
AGREEMENT, CHINESE WEAPONS SALES WITH INDIAN AMBASSADOR

REF: A. KATHMANDU 2516
 1B. BEIJING 18209
 1C. BEIJING 18123

Classified By: Amb. James F. Moriarty, Reason 1.4 (b/d)

Welcoming a UML-Maoist Agreement?

¶11. (C) In a November 21 discussion on developments in Nepal, the Ambassador and Indian Ambassador Shiv Mukherjee discussed a reported agreement between the political parties and the Maoists. The Ambassador related that British Ambassador Keith Bloomfield had approached him at a social function on November 18 to report that CPN-UML General Secretary MK Nepal, upon his return from New Delhi over the November 19-20 weekend, would announce an agreement with the Maoists. The terms of the agreement reportedly were that the Maoists would put their weapons under international supervision at the time of constituent assembly elections to be organized by an interim government. Bloomfield had asked that the USG endorse such an agreement if announced. (Note: MK Nepal did not make such an announcement over the weekend, but said that the Maoists would make an announcement in about a month. According to UML sources, any agreement between the UML and the Maoists would need approval by the UML's Central Committee and Standing Committee; presumably the seven-party alliance would also need to discuss and approve it. End Note.)

¶12. (C) The Ambassador explained to Mukherjee that he had said to Bloomfield that while the USG would welcome anything bringing the Maoists back into the political mainstream, "the devil would be in the details" of any such agreement. He had noted that the proposal Bloomfield had outlined was the same program the Maoists had long been pushing; it appeared to contain nothing preventing the Maoists from resorting to violence before constituent assembly elections. The Ambassador had conveyed to Bloomfield that such an agreement could be highly dangerous to the Parties, who would be greatly at risk if the Maoists moved back to violence after signing a pact with the Parties.

¶3. (S/NF) Mukherjee agreed that we had to push the political parties to be cautious. He commented that the Parties say the right things to us, but were under a great deal of pressure that could force them in strange directions. The Indian Ambassador stressed that he did not know what the Indian intelligence agencies were doing regarding arranging and organizing meetings for Maoists or Party leaders in India, that was "left to RAW." That said, Mukherjee stressed, Indian policy pushed for reconciliation between the King and Parties and recognized the danger of pushing a flawed agreement between the Parties and the Maoists.

Chinese Arms Sales to Nepal?

¶4. (S/NF) The Ambassador also relayed to Mukherjee the details of his November 18 discussion with Chinese Ambassador Sun Heping (ref A), who had categorically denied that China had large commercial weapons sales to Nepal in the works. The Ambassador compared Sun's assurances to the responses we had received in Beijing (refs B, C), which had been somewhat ambiguous about the sales. Noting that China had now received strong demarches from the U.S. and India, the Ambassador commented to Mukherjee that it appeared that the commercial deal might not be going through. Mukherjee agreed and said he would ask his Defense Attach to investigate further. The Ambassador remarked that the indication that the Chinese were not providing large-scale military support to Nepal dovetailed with an apparent desire on behalf of the Royal Nepal Army (RNA) to see the Maoist three month cease-fire extended and the government reciprocate. The RNA might well be getting nervous again about its lack of weapons and ammunition the Ambassador speculated. Mukherjee stated that in his last meeting with Chief of Army Staff Thapa,

Thapa had pushed India to release security assistance in the pipeline; if the RNA was going to receive AK-47s from China, Thapa would not have been so concerned about getting the Indian INSAS rifles, Mukherjee concluded. The Indian Ambassador added that, in his next meeting with COAS Thapa, he would encourage Thapa to highlight to the King the Army's dire needs and the desirability of a cease-fire.

MORIARTY